However, what do we mean when we discuss “water security”? Does it mean reliable access to water supplies? Perhaps reliable provision of water? Perhaps sustainable use? Something else?

Kibbutz Ketura in the Arava Valley, Israel (background) can satisfy its water needs, but does so by pumping groundwater from a fossil aquifer. Is Ketura water secure? [Photo credit Pat Keys, All Rights Reserved]

Wikipedia defines water security as

“the capacity of a population to ensure that they continue to have access to potable water.”

I think that this definition is too narrow, particularly because it doesn’t include many of the other uses of water that human societies depend on, such as food production and sanitation.

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) defines water security as such:

“…water security represents a unifying element supplying humanity with drinking water, hygiene and sanitation, food and fish, industrial resources, energy, transportation and natural amenities, all dependent upon maintaining ecosystem health and productivity.”

This definition provides a much more inclusive definition, but that creates much more complexity in determining whether water security has been achieved. (The above definition was from p. 47, “Water Security and Ecosystem Services: The Critical Connection”)

Also, if you’re active in the water world, especially online, then you’ve undoubtedly come across Dr. Michael Campana, (among his titles: Professor at OSU, 2011 President of AWRA, etc). In a recent interview he described water security as follows:

“Water security is the capacity of a population to access sufficient water to meet all its needs and to limit the destructive aspects of water. It involves both the productivity and destructivity of water.”

(from “Water Q & A” with Daniel Gilbert of IHP-HELP Centre for Water Law, Science, and Policy, July 4, 2011)… for more by Professor Campana, check out his blog WaterWired.

These Bedouin are watering a tree along the road, using water from a tanker truck. Is this use of water a need or a want? Are cultural needs equivalent to basic needs? [Photo credit Pat Keys, All Rights Reserved]

There are many other definitions out there, but I think some combination of UNEP’s and Professor Campana’s is on the right track. The common thread between the two is the suggestion that water security means sufficient access to meet humanity’s water needs while limiting negative consequences of this water withdrawal.

A few questions:

1. What constitutes a use of water that satisfies a need versus a want? Are grains needed while meat is a luxury? Where is the line drawn between meeting needs and wants?

2. What happens when we cross a threshold where even basic water needs (let alone wants) cannot be met without negatively impacting either other people or other ecosystems?

3. Have we already crossed this threshold?

“Reframing the Water Security Dialogue” by Dan Tarlock and Patricia Wouters* provides some in-depth discussion about the emergence of a

“…perfect storm of food, water and energy shortages – caused by a combination of population growth, triggering new rural and urban demands, and global climate change…”

Although this article is from the perspective of International Law, its relevance is beyond the scope of law only. The concept of a ‘perfect storm’ suggests that the threshold I mentioned above may be nearing.

Moving forward with this blog, I will be engaging the topic of water security from its multiple perspectives and dimensions as identified above. Furthermore, I will explore water security from the perspective of satisfying basic needs, and when it has moved beyond basic needs (e.g. swimming pools), we’re not talking about water security anymore, we’re talking about lifestyle security. I think this difference needs to be clarified since individuals, communities, states, and nations confuse the concepts of satisfying needs and wants. In a world that is experiencing a ‘perfect storm’, the difference between need and want matters tremendously.

The working definition that this blog will adopt is that used by UNEP, repeated here:

“…water security represents a unifying element supplying humanity with drinking water, hygiene and sanitation, food and fish, industrial resources, energy, transportation and natural amenities, all dependent upon maintaining ecosystem health and productivity.”

This is challenging because the definition is inclusive of many topics, and therefore extensive in its implications. However, I think that limiting the discussion to potable water only is far too narrow, and to properly understand water security the interlinkages between food, energy, and other needs must be integrated with potable needs.

The Jordan River is heavily polluted in its lower reaches, pictured above. However, the pollution comes from activities that are satisfying basic needs. How are trade-offs between needs of humans and ecosystems balanced? [Photo credit Pat Keys, All Rights Reserved]

The next post will examine the means by which we can ask “is [X] water secure?” [X] can be a community, nation, or individual. Particularly, the question will be explored from the perspective of a specific location’s water resources, and how to define where and how water reaches that location.

Thank you for reading and expect regular updates of this blog to commence from this point onwards!

* Tarlock, D. and Wouters, P. (2009). Reframing the water security dialogue. J. Water Law. 20 (2-3), 53-60

(This is the final installment, Part V, of Water Security Blog’s series on post-Mubarak Water Security, the previous posts are: 1. Mubarak’s Fall and the Future of the Nile Basin; 2. Egyptian Water Security vs. Ethiopian Development; 3. Egypt’s Jonglei Canal Gambit; and, 4. Egyptian Saber-rattling and a White Nile Coalition)

This series on Egyptian water security has explored the hydrology, diplomatic relations with upstream riparians, and potential infrastructure changes to White Nile and Blue Nile streamflow. The emphasis has been on the relationship between Egypt and Ethiopia, because as evidenced in the second post in the series, Egypt receives the majority of its Nile streamflow from the Blue Nile. This final post seeks to summarize the series and briefly explore a few potential scenarios for what the future may hold.

What have we learned?

As the upstream riparians of the Nile River are finally planning to use their water, specifically Ethiopia, Egypt’s water security is uncertain. However, as the details of the Millennium Dam are becoming evident, Egypt and Ethiopia have exchanged strong words; but so far, only words. It seems unlikely to me that the nations in the Nile would resort to violence, simply because it would (a) inflame existing instability, and (b) the international repercussions would likely be swift. Furthermore, recent news indicates that Egypt is more willing to cooperate than previously thought.

What is most likely is the continued development of Ethiopian water resources. If this is so, we can expect to see Egypt continuing to pursue alternative/ back-up strategies to ensure that it receives the flow it needs for agriculture, municipal, and industrial purposes.

The perspective of this series has been that of “what are the impacts of X on Egypt’s water security” and relatively scant attention has been paid to “whether or not X is appropriate.” The development of Ethiopian water resources, both for hydropower and agriculture, is to be considered an important step forward towards modernization. Given the ambition and the potential of Ethiopian water resources, important strides could be made towards providing food, energy, and jobs to the current residents of Ethiopia, many of who live in poverty.

Future scenarios

These are speculative scenarios for how Egypt’s water security may proceed, focusing on Egypt’s relationship with Ethiopia.

Scenario 1: War on the Nile

by Kobus Savonije, Picasa

Let it be known that this is considered very unlikely. If armed conflict was to emerge, it would likely begin with Egypt striking first, and would cost Egypt resources as well as potentially contribute to additional instability. Furthermore, if Egypt were to attack, it loses the moral high-ground that it is trying hard to cultivate with the international community, as it has tried to cast itself as somewhat of a  victim.

However, instability can often lead to the emergence of nationalist sentiments, and the seeking for a rallying cause. This fall, assuming democratic elections take place, it is possible that one ore more candidates may try and take advantage of this cause.  Mohamed Elbaradei, a strong contender for the Egyptian Presidency, has already indicated he can use strong language towards Israel, so it should be considered a possibility that he can direct that rhetoric towards other nations which threaten Egyptian interests.

Though I do not think this is likely, this scenario is potentially catastrophic and warrants consideration, if for no other reason, to illustrate what should not be allowed to happen.

Scenario 2: White Nile Coalition

Sudanese and Egyptian flags from “One Step Forward”

This was described in the previous post , regarding a potential collaboration among the White Nile Riparians. This was evidenced by Egyptian officials visiting White Nile nations (Uganda, South Sudan, and Sudan), and the promises made (e.g. South Sudanese development funds) and partnerships forged (e.g. Ugandan “tabling” of ratification of the Entebbe Agreement).

If Egypt successfully forms this White Nile Coalition, as a counter to Ethiopian control of the Blue Nile, then it is likely  that the chief impacts would be in the form of non-violent hostility, such as trade tariffs, trade embargoes, or marginalization in the international community.

Scenario 3: Egyptian & Ethiopian Cooperation

This is rarely suggested in either News reports or more thorough analyses; however, I think there is a strong case to be made for cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia. Egypt is much richer than Ethiopia, with a more diversified economy. Ethiopia has the potential to store a great deal more water in the Blue Nile, which could have further benefits to downstream nations in terms of preparing for and adapting to changes in streamflow.

Cooperation would also provide an opportunity for Egypt to monitor construction of new dams along the Blue Nile, and play a role in the negotiations of when and how these dams are filled. Hostility would not be likely to produce the same willingness to share this type of information.

Recent news indicates that it is looking increasingly likely that Egypt will pursue a strategy of cooperation. Egyptian Ambassdor to Ethiopia, Tarik Ghoneim, said Thursday: “Everything is on the table.” He says Egypt’s new government wants to start discussions with all nine Nile countries about using waters in the best interest of all.

The long-term impact of this “willingness to negotiate” will be measured by Egypt’s willingness to participate in international treaties, specifically the Entebbe Agreement/Comprehensive Framework Agreement. I predict that Egypt will seek only bilateral cooperation with Ethiopia, and avoid larger agreements because there is more sacrifice associated with a broader agreement.

Conclusions

The final message of this series, though not apparent at first, appears to be a positive one of cooperation. Though the news mentioned above is less than a day old, it suggests that Egypt is seeking a balanced and regionally productive approach to managing transboundary issues.  Rest assured, however, that updates to Egyptian Nile relations will be explored as they arise, here on this blog.

What’s next?

Center pivot irrigation in Sahara, from Wikipedia

In exploring the relationship between Egypt and its dependence on the Nile River, interesting questions have arisen. Among these, what has been interesting to me is the foreign acquisition of land resources for the purposes of food security (or biofuels security). This land acquisition, also known as “land-grabs”,  is taking place quickly, in a less-than-transparent manner, and is concentrated in Africa. Given that large-scale appropriation of water for irrigation can be disastrous for downstream users (see inflows of the Colorado river to Mexico) it is worth exploring the potential impacts of irrigating these land acquisitions relative to changes in streamflow.

This will be the topic of the next series. “Global Land-grabs and Irrigation.” Gathering the necessary information for this will take a bit of time, so please be patient!

David Zetland, over at Aguanomics, is releasing a new book this Summer called “The End of Abundance: economic solutions to water scarcity.” He is a senior economist at Wageningen University, in the Netherlands, and tends to have thought provoking policy disagreements with water wonks such as Peter Gleick, et al. If you’re looking for a realistic economists’ view on water policy, you’ll be interested in this book.

The End of Abundance promises to be a polished-up, book version of his blog, focusing on how the institutions and economics that were formed during an era of water abundance are ill-equipped to handle the needs of a water scarce 21st century.

Zetland says about the book..

I’ve written it for “people like you” — folks who may not be economists but who are interested in understanding or using economics to improve water management. I am writing for engineers, managers, lawyers, environmentalists, biologists, political staffers and farmers…

The book has a website here, and, according to Zetland,

…will eventually include sample chapters, blurbs/reviews, a discussion forum, multiple ways to purchase the book, etc.

Follow him on twitter for continuing updates, and you can expect a review on this blog when it is released around June 1!

(This is Part IV of Water Security Blog’s series on post-Mubarak Water Security, the previous posts are: 1. Mubarak’s Fall and the Future of the Nile Basin; 2. Egyptian Water Security vs. Ethiopian Development; and 3. Egypt’s Jonglei Canal Gambit.)

Photo by Nabil Omar, from Wikipedia

Over the last few weeks, the Egyptian leadership has moved further and further away from Mubarak style diplomacy, towards a more active and “in-your-face” style diplomacy. In the first post we asked what the post-Mubarak regime would look like, and whether they would be more amenable to upstream riparians and the Entebbe Agreement, or whether they would take a more hawkish stance. The verdict is in, and they are not only more hawkish in speech, but appear to be more hawkish in behavior.

As of this morning (April 8, 2011) Egypt looks to be cementing relationships along the White Nile to act as a buffer to unilateral Ethiopian development along the Blue Nile. This is both strategic and necessary on Egypt’s part to ensure that when the “Great Millennium Dam” is constructed, and filling, that Egypt continues to have an adequate flow in the Nile. Furthermore, by cementing relationships with upstream riparians, this blog is arguing that Egypt may be in the process of forming a “White Nile Coalition” that can act as a nested interest group within the larger Nile basin.

Outside of Nile Basin policy, Egypt is taking a hardline stance against Israeli activity (by making overt threats related to Gaza), and reversing the more-or-less frozen ties with Iran. The implications of these developments on Nile Basin water security are limited, save for the importance of acquiring regional allies, that are of strategic geopolitical importance.

This post seeks to summarize the current flurry of News reports, unpack some of these issues, and provide some analysis on where things are headed.

Egypt strengthening ties with White Nile Riparians

All signs suggest that Egypt is not resting while the Entebbe Agreement (a.k.a. the Comprehensive Framework Agreement) inches closer to becoming a fully fledged International Treaty. A recent Newsvision article seems to suggest that Uganda may hold-off on ratifying the Entebbe Agreement until Egypt undergoes its post-Mubarak transition. The article is quoted below:

“Museveni said Uganda was willing to wait for Egypt to reorganise herself before she could ratify.”

If this is true, then Uganda may be much closer to Egypt than earlier assumed. Also, it begs the question: What did Egypt offer in exchange for this delay? It would be foolish to think that Uganda is doing this out of generosity, and thus the details for this agreement between the two nations are important.

Photo from Wikipedia

This comes closely on the heels of another high level visit by interim Egyptian leadership to the new country of South Sudan, as discussed in the previous post here. In short, Egypt’s stated interests were to help South Sudan develop economically, including restarting the Jonglei Canal project to drain the Sudd wetlands (depicted above).

All of this points to a concerted effort on the part of Egypt to cement relations along the White Nile, likely towards the goal of forming either a formal or informal coalition. Though its unlikely that the purpose of this coalition would be for military purposes, it is not unreasonable to think that this group could serve exclusionary purposes, including favorable trade agreements or development assistance among coalition nations.

Current Egyptian regime more volatile than predecessor

The hawkish activity within the Nile basin is mirrored by hawkish activity outside the basin. A trademark of the Mubarak regime was regional stability, both in the regime’s maintenance of diplomatic ties with Israel and with the broader Middle East North Africa (MENA) region. In general, there was very little saber-rattling.

Photo from Wikipedia

Not so anymore. Recent news reports suggest that on various fronts, Egypt may be ramping up its military rhetoric as well as strengthening ties with regional nations that have a track record of anti-Israel rhetoric- specifically Iran. In February, for the first time sinze 1979, Egypt allowed to Iranian boats through the Suez Canal, including the Iranian warship Alvand. Though this does not mean Egypt wants a war, it is apparently comfortable with Iranian boats floating right next to Israel (a country that Iran has in the past threatened directly).

Photo from Wikimedia

Several days ago, Mohammed Elbaradei – a former International Atomic Energy Agency inspector (IAEA), Professor, and Nobel laureate – met with Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, President of Iran. This wouldn’t be terrible on its own, however a recent soundbite from Elbaradei is reason for pause. Elbaradei is quoted as saying: “In case of any future Israeli attack on Gaza – as the next president of Egypt – I will open the Rafah border crossing and will consider different ways to implement the joint Arab defense agreement.”

Photo from Wikipedia

So, what constitutes an attack? What does “implement the joint Arab defense agreement” actually mean? Boots on the ground? Since the Muslim Brotherhood does not have the power that many news outlets suggest (for more on that read this), Elbaradei is a very realistic candidate for future president. Now, it could be that he is bulking up his “tough-talk” street-cred to cozy up to the current interim Egyptian military leaders, or, he could actually be quite hawkish. Time will tell.

Positive outcome?

This increase in aggressive rhetoric could be interpreted as a bad omen. Many in the MENA region and beyond are frightened that these words are drum-beats for a war march. However, I think there is a great deal of room for optimism, primarily because the question of an actual war between Arab nations and Israel would draw in other allies that have enormous stake in the stability of the region, specifically the US and China. Why? Oil (obviously).

Photo from Wikipedia

Actions speak louder though, and actions by these global powers are being taken. This is evidenced by China sending its special envoy for Middle East affairs, Wu Sike, to Israel, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Qatar, in an effort to encourage the Peace Process. China has no desire for Middle Eastern tensions to actually erupt into violence, because it would threaten the pace of their development – which isn’t  an option for the Communist regime. Rising fuel prices in China would foment existing discontent and could lead to unrest similar to what we have seen in many Arab nations. China will do everything it can to avoid this.

It is also worth noting that China is beginning to act like a global power, perhaps even inadvertently preparing to wear the mantle of the (emerging global superpower. That, however, is fodder for another post…

What does it mean for Water Security in the region?

This blog is about water security, not international security in general, so what does this mean for the Nile Basin? In general, this increased hawkishness by Egypt means that the ratification of the Entebbe Agreement will likely move more slowly, especially as this White Nile Coalition takes shape.

For Ethiopian development, particularly for the Great Millennium Dam, it means that a more unified White Nile could make trade and other international activity more difficult. Since the Great Millennium Dam costs 4.8 billion USD, equal to 95% of the Ethiopian governments fiscal year 2011 budget, Ethiopian is very nearly going “all-in.”

I predict that China will step up its efforts to mediate relations in the basin for the simple reason that it has made a significant investment in the hydrological future of Ethiopia, specifically in its hydropower (dam) infrastructure. These investments are likely not a generous act on behalf of the Chinese, but almost certainly related to the fact that China’s food security will require massive imports of cereals and other crops in the coming decades, and Ethiopia’s abundant water resources make it a viable candidate for this necessary agricultural expansion.

Photo by Steve Evans, from Wikipedia

That prediction should of course be taken with a grain of salt, given how quickly things on the ground change.

Also, I’ve been trying to tell you what to expect from “upcoming posts”, but seeing as how Current Events have called me to the other topics, I’ll just say that expect more on this topic soon.

If you have comments, thoughts, or reactions, please feel free to share them, and please keep them in the spirit of furthering the discussion, because I will reject comments that are outwardly hostile, especially if they are hostile to specific nations or peoples.

(This is a continuation of two posts: first, Mubarak’s Fall and the Future of the Nile Basin ; and, second, Egyptian Water Security vs. Ethiopian Development)

In the previous two posts, post-Mubarak Egyptian water security and conflicts with upstream Ethiopian development were explored. It was argued that Egypt’s post-Mubarak water policy must remain hawkish in order to vie with the emerging upstream powers, notably Ethiopia’s development of the Blue Nile.

Though I indicated that the next post would be specifically on the Comprehensive Framework Agreement and future scenarios of development within the Nile Basin, other news must first be discussed.

Egypt Renews Interest in Jonglei Canal

On March 27th the current Prime Minister of Egypt, Essam Sharaf, visited government officials in the soon-to-be-partitioned Republic of South Sudan (here referred to as South Sudan). Although pre-trip  press releases suggested that PM Sharaf would be discussing Nile River issues with South Sudan, it was unclear that the Jonglei Canal was among them. Whats more, the Sudan Vision daily newspaper reports that various Egyptian ministers, including Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Nabil Al Arabi, and Egyptian Minister of Water Sources, Dr. Hussein Al-Atfi, met with South Sudanese government representatives to discuss specific partnerships with regard to flow monitoring equipment and planned, bilateral cooperation.

Although this news is only a few days old, these are the first explicitly water-oriented actions of the new Egyptian political regime, and these statements and actions suggest that the new Egyptian government plans to be actively involved with upstream Nile nations, specifically with those nations that Egypt has historically strong ties.

This news is enormously important, because until recently, the Jonglei Canal has been a backwater (no pun intended) issue, given the continued lack of action.

Why is this a Gambit?

Renewing interest in the Jonglei is a gambit for Egypt in the sense of the so-named chess move; where a sacrifice is made to gain advantage.

Photo from Wikimedia

By agreeing to share the water that the Jonglei Canal would transport equally with South Sudan, Egypt is hoping that this hydro-diplomacy will cement their ability to exert influence in the new nation.

The Jonglei Canal – a Primer

The White Nile enters South Sudan from the south via Uganda. Shortly after entering Sudan, the Nile enters a vast marsh/wetland/swamp area known as the Sudd. The Nile enters the Sudd with an average flowrate of 1,048 m^3/s and leaves the Sudd with an average flowrate of 510 m^3/s. Therefore, approximately 500 m^3/s is “lost” in the Sudd (which if totaled over an entire year, equals approx. 15 cubic kilometers per year).

The  Jonglei diversion project would largely bypass the Sudd, with a 360 kilometer (or 220 miles) canal. For a sense of scale, this is equal to the straight-line distance between either New York to Washington DC; London to Paris; or the North-South length of of Taiwan.

The goal would be to transport more water downstream, that can be used for irrigated agriculture in Egypt, Sudan, and now, South Sudan.

History

First proposed in 1930 by hydrogeologists, the Egyptian government studied the diversion project during the 40′s and begin planning in the 50′s.  Construction began in the 70′s and stopped in 1984.  By the end of 1984, 240 of the planned 360 km had been completed. Construction halted due to actions by the South Sudanese rebels in 1984, and has not resumed since.  Until now, the project has remained a remote possibility due to a lack of political will both upstream and downstream.

Photo from United Nations

[The photo above is of the rusting hulk of a german made excavator, apparently named "Sarah", that was abandoned after canal construction was halted in 1984]

The stakes: The Sudd

The Sudd (a.k.a. the Bahr al Jabal, Al Sudd or As Sudd) is an enormous wetland, fed by the White Nile, that has an average size of 30,000 square kilometers (although during the wet season, it can become as large as 130,000 sq. km.)

For an in depth overview of the Sudd, I recommend going to the Wikipedia page, which has sections on climate, geomorphology, population, and ecology. The important point is that the Jonglei Canal would, for the most part, drain the Sudd. Numerous studies have been conducted that provide ample evidence that there are both vibrant ecosystems (including huge numbers of wildlife) as well as diverse pastoral societies (notably the Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk), that exist in the Sudd.

What are the Consequences of the Draining the Sudd to construct the Jonglei Canal?

Draining the Sudd would likely reduce, if not fully eliminate, many of the afore-mentioned human and non-human systems. A few of these impacts are detailed below.

Physical Consequences

The Jonglei Canal would be disastrous for the Sudd, specifically the diverse ecology that exists there.  There are over 400 species of birds that either live or migrate through the Sudd, as well as enormous numbers of large animals that forage and water in the Sudd region.

Photo by Charlesjsharp, from Wikipedia

Also, though Egypt and the other backers of a renewed Jonglei Canal project claim that the canal prevents the water from being “lost”, this is not entirely accurate. Lost is an inappropriate term, since recent research (Keys et al.submitted) suggests that a large amount of growing season precipitation originates as terrestrial evaporation over the Sudd. Removing the Sudd could thus have large implications for, albeit distant, rainfed agriculture in the Sahelian region.

Political & Economic

Increased Egyptian influence could potentially have a stabilizing effect on relations between the Sudan and new Republic of South Sudan.

Internally, however, it is unclear whether the negative consequences of draining the Sudd or the postive impacts from the construction of the Canal, would win the day. Southern Sudan has, historically, been racked by war and ethnic strife, and removing a key stabilizing factor (access to water and suitable grazing land for the predominantly pastoralist societies) would almost certainly inflame these tensions.

Photo by Tim McKulka, UN Media

However, if Southern Sudan can provide the means for the dislocated communities to receive the Egyptian influxes of capital, in the form of local jobs (canal construction and operation) and opportunities for communities (improved infrastructure, including electricity, water, roads, and potentially education), it is possible that these potential tensions may be reduced.

When Could the Jonglei be Completed?

It is unclear how long it would take to complete the project, but apparently in 2008 Sudanese and Egyptian authorities set a target of 24 years; in other words “Here’s a date that is so far into the future, that we aren’t going to worry about it.”

However, if Egypt is serious about investing in the Jonglei Canal (and it would appear they are serious based on the overwhelming display of Government Ministers on the recent trip to South Sudan), then it is probable that the project could take little more than a decade. This conservative estimate is based on the fact that the early construction completed 2/3 of the project (240 km of 360 km) in approximately 6-years, despite political unrest.

Foundations of a Nile Basin Showdown?

With Egypt courting the partnership of South Sudan, it seems much less likely that the government of South Sudan will sign the Comprehensive Framework Agreement (CFA).  Though there are many other nations in the Nile Basin that have signed the CFA, losing South Sudan’s support would be significant because it represented a major potential downstream partner.  The other signatories, Burundi, The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda,  are all generally upstream providers of the Nile River.

Including South Sudan in the CFA could mean a bridge between the currently upstream providers of the Nile waters and the downstream recipients.  In this scenario, South Sudan could act as an intermediary, facilitating dialogue between the upstream and downstream nations.

However, if Egyptian political and economic influence begins to play a major role in South Sudanese water security, it is unlikely that South Sudan would jeopardize their situation by signing a politically volatile treaty with the upstream nations.

What is the Future of the CFA in the Nile?

If this is true, then it is possible that the CFA may become irrelevant as a diplomatic tool for governing the Nile, and that the issue of allocating the finite waters among the Nile riparians will remain an uncoordinated endeavor.

The next post in this series will (likely) explore how these emerging issues will inform the ongoing CFA effort and how these new development may inform Future Scenarios for the Nile Basin.

(This is a continuation of a post here: Mubarak’s Fall and the Future of the Nile Basin)

In the previous post, the post-Mubarak political terrain was examined, with particular emphasis on how the polarity of power may be shifting away from Egypt and Sudan, towards the more coordinated upstream nations.  It was concluded, that without the hawkish stance of Mubarak, Egyptian influence in the Nile Basin may wane, while the influence of upstream nations may grow.

As the title of this post indicates, Egyptian water security is closely related to the development of Ethiopian water resources.  Based on the volume of water that Ethiopia contributes to the total Nile River flow, I argue that the most critical decisions impacting Egyptian water resources in the coming decades, will be implicitly related to Ethiopian development of its renewable water resources resources, specifically in terms of hydropower and irrigation.

Hydrology Overview

The Nile River encompasses a vast watershed, and is considered the longest river in the world, measuring 6,550 km, from the White Nile headwaters in Burundi to the delta in Egypt.

(click map to enlarge)

Photo from World Bank

Though there is enormous complexity that could be discussed, this ‘hydrology’ discussion will be limited to average streamflow. Below is a summary table of the average discharge at key points along the tributaries of the Nile.

Adapted from Wikipedia

An important characteristic of the Nile is the Sudd, which is a vast wetland in Sudan, where the White Nile enters with 1,048 cubic meters per second and exits with 510 cubic meters per second.  This loss is equivalent to 15 cubic kilometers per year.  This is an enormous volume of water, however it is worth comparing it to the volume of water lost from evaporation in the Aswan High Dam, which is roughly 10 cubic kilometers per year. The Jonglei canal, a planned diversion past the Sudd to increase the downstream flow, has been discussed for decades, though it’s construction is unlikely in the near term, not least because the Sudd now falls in the domain of the new Republic of South Sudan.

Additionally, you may notice that the flowrates from the White Nile, Blue Nile, and Atabara do not add up to the average discharge at the Nile Delta.  This is attributed to the evaporation losses in the Aswan High Dam, along with the very significant abstractions that are used for irrigation (that never return to the main stem of the river).

The Blue Nile = Egypt’s Lifeblood

For Egypt, the Blue Nile is the most critical component of water security. Though the White Nile provides the stable flow during the dry season, this volume of water (relative to the wet season flow) is much less significant.  This has been recognized as recently as March 3, 2011, with the Egyptian Ministry of Irrigation “seeking to form a legal committee that will help ensure Egypt retains its “historic water rights“, as well as aiming to step up cooperation with Ethiopian water projects.

Tississat falls on the Blue Nile (posted to Flickr by Giustino)

Photo by Giustino, from Flickr

Furthermore, given that the Blue Nile originates in Ethiopia, the dependence of Egypt on Ethiopian water resources management is clear.  Currently, the Ethiopian government is doing very little to alter the flow of the Blue Nile, given that access to the river is largely prohibited by a deep, treacherous, and long gorge.  If Ethiopia were to undertake large scale hydropower projects on the Blue Nile, there could be serious implications for downstream users (read: Sudan & Egypt) when (1) hydropower reservoirs are filled (when downstream flows could be significantly reduced) and when (2) irrigated agriculture emerges, since the hydropower infrastructure, namely roads and access to electricity, would make this a possibility.

Dams & Irrigation

The importance of the Blue Nile to Egypt’s flow suggests that any alteration of the flow-rate, particularly on the part of Ethiopia, could be very important to downstream consumption.

As an example we will look at the Tana-Beles hydropower project, potentially Ethiopia’s largest power plant, which is located on the Beles River and Lake Tana, tributaries of the Blue Nile River.  The project, which was begun in 1992, reached a milestone in 2010, when the first electricity was generated (115 MW).  Eventually, the goal is to generate 460 MW and provide irrigation for 140,000 hectares (ha). Irrigating 140,000 hectares is a considerable volume of water, if you assume that the depth of irrigation is 1 centimeter (which is a very conservative estimate).  After converting all the units, that is equal to 14 million cubic meters.  Compared to the flow of the Blue Nile, this is negligible; less than 1/millionth of total discharge.  However, this is only one project, and the potential for more irrigation is enormous.

According to a 2009 report published by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Ethiopia is currently irrigating 289,530 hectares (ha), which is only 11% of its irrigation potential (irrigation potential is a term used by the Food & Agricultural Organization (FAO) to denote “land resources suitable for irrigation”). Compare Ethiopia’s values to Egypt’s, which is irrigating nearly 3.5 million ha, and is at 77% of its irrigation potential.

Additionally, the same IFPRI report examines ‘Total Available Renewable Water Resources’ or TARWR.  There are several measures they use summarized in the table below.

Egypt’s numbers are (not surprisingly) quite high.  The dam capacity per capita is especially large compared to most other African nations (although not as high as Ghana, due to the enormous Lake Volta behind the Akosombo Dam).  Ethiopia’s figures are, by comparison, very low.  The general conclusion a reader may draw from this table is that Ethiopia has enormous potential to build more dams.

Chinese Influence

The importance of the Chinese in developing Ethiopian water resources must not be understated. As the Wikipedia table below demonstrates, 6 of the 11 (or more than 50%) of Ethiopian dams have been, or will be, contracted to Chinese corporations.  And since three of the dams were “no bid” contracts, China received 6 of the 8 “bid” contracts, thus making China (or Chinese corporations) responsible for underwriting 75% of Ethiopia’s dams. At this point, it is abundantly clear that China has enormous interest in Africa, both in terms of influence and resources.  Whether it is land acquisitions for food production, oil contracts, or (in this case) hydropower production, China is a major force in African infrastructure.

(click to enlarge)

What China’s involvement with Ethiopian water resources implies for the future of Nile basin politics remains to be seen.  However, I think it is very unlikely that China would allow its significant investments of money and good-will in Ethiopian infrastructure to be threatened by Egyptian military force. Perhaps with the emergence of China as a major player in the development of Nile basin water resources, we are also witnessing the emergence of a new balance of power, with the interests of downstream Egypt (historically guaranteed by the US) vying with the interests of upstream Ethiopia (which may now be guaranteed by China).

In the next post, the status of the Comprehensive Framework Agreement will be examined, with an examination of the impacts on Egyptian water resources, and the potential timeline associated with ratification of the CFA.

NEXT: The CFA and some Future Scenarios

Jan25 Youth Revolt & Mubarak’s Fall

With Mubarak stepping down, the army taking over, and many political & democratic unknowns, the future of the Nile Basin and the status quo of the previous 30 years is uncertain.  (To catch you up if you didn’t hear the recent news: after several weeks of largely peaceful protests and demonstrations by hundreds of thousands of Egyptians, the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stepped down after 30 years of rule.  The armed forces have taken over the government, dissolved the (largely corrupt) constitution, and is expected to hold normal elections this September.  If you want to know more, check out this detailed article about the recent and current dynamics that have shaped what has become known as the “Jan25 Youth Revolt or Jan25 Revolution.” )

Photo from Wikimedia Commons

What does all this mean for water security in the Nile Basin?  How will the departure of Mubarak impact ongoing discussions about allocation of the Nile, specifically is the new leadership going to remain as hawkish towards Egypt’s upstream riparian neighbors?

Multipart Series on Water Security in the Nile Basin

Over the next few posts, we’re going to explore the recent history of the Nile Basin, the relevant hydrology, and the ongoing discussions about allocation.  Additionally, we’ll take a look at what the future might hold specifically for Egyptian water resources, but for the Nile broadly, under climate change conditions.

Photo from Wikimedia, German Federal Archive

To begin with, though, lets take a look at the recent past to get a current snapshot.

Mubarak and Recent Nile Issues

Hosni Mubarak was a water hawk, in that he was unrepentant about not giving in on Egypt’s rights to the majority of the annual flow of the Nile, based on the 1959 treaty signed by Sudan and Egypt.  Regardless of their actually being ten nations that contribute to and/or consume water from the Nile, Mubarak stood firm.

As recently as the Spring of 2010, Mubarak and his cabinet were vocal about Egypt’s desire to influence allocation of the Nile.  In April 2010, Egypt’s water minister called for Egypt and Sudan to have the right to “veto any projects that may threaten their water security.” Similarly, in May of 2010 Mubarak met with the presidents of Kenya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), to discuss the agreement set forth by the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) that seeks to equitably allocate the Nile waters among the 10 riparian nations.  Kenya had already signed, and the DRC promised to sign it in 2011.

Currently, Ethiopia is the wildcard for Egypt, since it provides over 80% of the Nile water that Egypt eventually receives.  If a new water hawk does not emerge in Egypt, the other Nile nations may combine their collective power to ‘encourage’ Egypt into accepting a less beneficial agreement in order to have a seat at the negotiation table.

Egypt’s claim to a large portion of the Nile was articulated in 2010 by Mubarak’s water minister Mufid Shehab when he suggested that the “issue of Nile water is a matter of ‘life and death,’ since 95 percent of Egypt’s water resources came from the Nile, unlike Nile Basin states that have plentiful alternative water sources.”  However, this precept is likely to be challenged by upstream neighbors over the coming decades, as water resources overall become more scarce with increased population growth, increased development, increased temperatures (from climate change), and decreased flow (due to formal and informal irrigation diversions).

Example of changing future of the Nile Basin Riparians; click to enlarge (based on data from Wikipedia).

Current Events: 11th Riparian & Nile Day in DRC

Recently, the citizens of the Republic of South Sudan have elected to break away from Sudan, and form their own nation, becoming the 193rd in the world (as recognized by the UN), and the 11th riparian of the Nile Basin (since the White Nile passes directly through it, and notably it contains the Sudd Wetlands).  Whether and how Southern Sudan decides to interact with the ongoing Nile negotiations remains to be seen.

Yesterday (February 22), the annual Nile Day celebration was held in Goma, DRC.  Though there are no recent updates available, DRC Minister of Environment and Lands Stanilas Kamanzi indicated that the DRC planned to sign the Comprehensive Framework Agreement (CFA).  The CFA has been developed by several Nile riparians, and seeks to replace the NBI.  Currently, the CFA has five signatories (Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda), and needs six signatories (and legislative ratifications) to come into effect.  With both the DRC and Burundi expected to sign the document, Egypt risks falling by the wayside as the upstream riparians unite to exert greater control on the uncooperative downstream riparians.

A Diminished Role?

Egypt’s claim to Nile waters was forcibly (politically speaking) led by Mubarak for the last 30 years.  Despite the dominant role Egypt has played in the past, Egypt’s place at the negotiation table and ability to influence Nile Basin politics may diminish with the departure of Mubarak. In the next few posts we will explore the basics of the physical system, to provide the framework on which we can understand future developments in the basin.

Also, for a broader overview (examining the entire basin), check out Wikipedia’s excellent summary on ‘Water Politics in the Nile Basin.’

NEXT POST: Egyptian Water Security vs. Ethiopian Development

A recent China Daily article says “Some 2.57 million people and 2.79 million livestock are suffering from drinking water shortages, official figures showed…Eight major grain-producing provinces, including Shandong, Jiangsu, Henan, Hebei and Shanxi, have been affected. Together they produce more than 80 percent of China’s winter wheat.”  In response to the drought, the People’s Daily reports, “Zhang Qiang, head of Beijing’s artificial weather intervention office, said the office began cloud-seeding Wednesday night in nine districts and counties of Miyun, Mentougou, Yanqing, Haidian, Pinggu, Changping, Shijingshan, Fangshan and Huairou… By 6 a.m. Thursday, 759 silver iodide rods had been used to increase precipitation.” (sidenote: Interesting that China has state-sponsored & endorsed  ”artificial weather intervention offices”).

The major issue is that if China’s domestic grain supplies tumble, they will be forced to purchase grain from the international market; which happens to already be overtaxed by under-supply.  This graph depicts the top 10 wheat importers by tonnage (chart found here; data from USDA).

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As you can see, China is not in the top 10.  In fact its ranked 34, between Iraq and Pakistan.  For a country the size of China to be that far down this list is very surprising, and goes to show how self-sufficient they are.  However, this hides the mass of people in China.

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Furthermore, sustained temperature increases can be expected from climate change, along with more frequent extreme events, including droughts and dry-spells.  If China were to switch permanently to a grain importer, rather than a grain exporter (as Lester Brown suggested over a decade ago), then serious adjustments to global food production will need to be addressed, including increased exploration of GM and non-GM drought resistant varieties.

China has invested billions of yuan into controlling flooding and harnessing hydropower.  It has also invested billions into the (mostly forced) relocation of millions of its own citizens. According to Wikipedia, China relocated 1.24 million people to make way for the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River.  The number of people being relocated in Anhui province is less than 1/3 of the relocation required for the Three Gorges project, but still, 1/3!  By any measure, 390,000 people is an enormous number.  Whats more, it requires rebuilding the infrastructure somewhere else!  For example, this relocation effort would be like moving all of the people in the city of Minneapolis, MN to a new city… and building a whole new Minneapolis (see Google Earth version of Minneapolis skyline below).

What I find interesting about this is that currently the Chinese government has both the financial resources, material, and political clout to actually pull this off. There will inevitably be disagreement and protests, but I have very little doubt that this relocation will happen.  The question is, what happens when/if the Chinese people acquire greater rights, specifically personal freedoms and the right to disagree with the government?  Will the speed with which decisions such as these are acted upon decrease?  Does the fact that China has centralized governance mean that it is better at the execution of long-term strategic infrastructure planning?

Whatever your feelings are toward Communist rule in China, the ability of the government to move quickly on very large scale projects such as this allows it an agility in policy that representative democracies rarely seem to have.

Check out the latest BBC story (among others) on the spill.  The following is from the BBC:

The sludge is a by-product from the early stage of aluminium production, which leaked from storage reservoirs.  As part of the process, bauxite, the raw material, is taken out of the ground and washed with sodium hydroxide.  This produces alumina, which is processed further, and waste, which is composed of solid impurities, heavy metals, and the chemicals used as processing agents.

About 40%-45% of the waste is iron-oxide, which gives it the red colour.  Another 10%-15% is aluminium oxide, a further 10%-15% silicon oxide and there are smaller quantities of calcium oxide, titanium dioxide and sodium oxide, according to MAL Hungarian Aluminium, the company that owns the Ajkai plant.

Also, here is the link to the Wikipedia article which has updated facts and link.

It seems relatively rare that this type of event occurs in the developed world.  This type of activity is much more commonplace in poorer countries, namely in Africa and Asia, but that doesn’t make it more excusable.

How will the downstream nations respond to Hungary if there is a loss of jobs, impacts to human health, and ecosystem degradation?